immigration

20181206: San Francisco | London | Zurich | Berlin

I always wanted to get to know Christian Ebert better. During our overlapping time at San Francisco Art Institute and later during his six months marriage to Stephanie, which was terminated like an unwanted child in the second trimester, we crossed paths only long enough to get a sense that he was a great guy, but never enough time to get into the weeds. Stephanie lived in Berlin with her husband and children; instead, I reached out to Christian.

He suggested we meet at Hamburger Bahnhof. At first I thought he was making a joke about the Hauptbahnhof. I arrived two hours early and decided to see the show without him, once, so I wouldn't feel rushed or distracted. In the central Historic Hall was a four projection installation of Agnieszka Polska entitled, "The Demon's Brain." The screens shows footage of a devastated forest, dialogue between two people that are dressed to medieval period, a horse rider and a strange, hand-drawn animated owl, which I presumed was the demon. Between the projections were piles of foam core mattresses for visitors to sit on. The film follows "a young messenger tasked with delivering these letters on horseback. Along the way, the boy loses his horse and he gets lost in the forest. There he has an unexpected encounter with a demon, whose monologue fuses Christian theological ideas with today’s developments concerning resource consumption, environmental destruction, data capital, and artificial intelligence." [1] Thematically I really enjoyed the work, but I found that animated parts to be visually hard to swallow. The live film was UHD and cinematic while the animated interludes felt like moving clip art or cartoons. The white horse sequences, rendered in 1990s CGI style, were interesting. The audio was really great. I watched other visitors try to make sense of how to engage this, and most looked like I felt: lost. As a narrative in which there is something “to get,” and, by extension, a necessity “to follow” what is going on, the work may have been better suited for a sit and watch black box setting, rather than multi-channel, meandering format. But that’s another position in contemporary art.

I saw “How to talk with birds, trees, fish, shells, snakes, bulls and lions,” as well, but didn’t feel very much from it. Topically, I was very interested in:

“The emphasis on “speaking” or “talking” raises questions as to how meaning is created and conveyed, and for whom. The concept of “meaning” in Western science seems especially human, since most semiotic modes of communication presuppose a human mindset. And yet language is just one mode of expression in the planetary semiosis, and like other meaningful acts, it is rooted in the environment and all those dependent on it.” [2]

Visually, the show was boring maybe because it actually fulfilled the vision of the international artspeak statement. Don’t use ‘semiosis’ on a wall text. We get that you have a PhD. Also due to the disparate styles of the participating artists, in part due to the poor quality of the artworks. Nothing even slowed my meander through the space.

Christian punctually arrived and we took a coffee in the cafe. I shared with him my sense of never really having got to know him; he corroborated the feeling. Christian makes hard line, abstract paintings, most recently with geometric, triangle and parallelograms. The arc of the conversation bowed under the pressures we both felt to produce art but were a loss not only on how to make a financial foundation from it but how to make the next step in our careers. Painting world and the contemporary art world. Identity politics v. 2.0 and the rest. Positions. We talked about the illusion of teaching artist being outside of the gig economy within which most other artists exist, and the difference of New York and Berlin. It was a conversation that seemed to be on repeat with artists I knew, regardless of their level of “success,” i.e. exhibition history, gallery representation, number of sales or relationship with institutions. (Collectively, this could have been the conversation that bridged the emerging career to the mid-career. The illusion, I thought, was that the “emerging” is a gerund–the stage is one of a process, presupposing action and participation. Was mid-career also gerund? Perhaps it was just “exist early” and if you’re still alive later, there’s a chance of afterwards.) We all seemed to feel that there was more than what we had; and we all hoped that if we had more it would be fulfilling financially, artistically, professionally and personally. That is, we wanted our art practice to do everything for us, to be gesamlebenwerk.

I met Katharina during Sound Development City. She introduced herself back then as an urban researcher; six years later she was finishing a PhD in Urban Planning and was quick to admit that she’d tired of academia and her thesis topic, which she refused to share with me. In the last six years, I had gravitated toward her specialty, probably because I’d been stuck in cities and, even when traveling away from New York, I ended up in another city. Her general focus was on immigration, which itself was a curious inclusion within the field of urban planning. Rather than strictly thinking about streets, infrastructure and zoning, the integration of the immigrant, the foreigner whose class and economic status is presupposed, into the urban plan suggested a further–literally transnational–extension of the focus of the biopolitical. That is, no longer were governing bodies concerned exclusively with their sovereign subjects but with the livelihood of those outside their sovereignty.

In a classic “urban” tradition, i.e. urbanization in the original form of which Ildefons Cerda conceived, the extension of the urban plan onto the rural can now include the projection of the immigrant, the foreigner, first into the urban fabric, localized into what is traditionally thought of as the “city limits” but also later into the suburb and the rural, ultimately “urbanizing” these areas ethnologically. I doubted that this exact theater of generations was what was feared in the political current of ruralites, who didn’t experience immigration and immigrants in the same way that urbanites did but fear them nonetheless. I expected that a more simplistic fear was at work, especially from a perspective of juxtaposition between where it was that people were coming. Which sociopolitical systems each country had and how immigration was seen to interface with it. i.e. Europeans that opposed immigration often did so on the grounds that the immigrants were believed to “exploit” existing social welfare systems, which suggested these systems were both definite and required exchange by paying into them before taking out of them.

“The American urban experience, of immigrants reviving aging inner-cities, sharply contrasts with that of Europe, where immigrants often cluster in large cities but remain marginalized economically and socially, imposing many costs and becoming seen as a long-term drag on growth and vitality.” [3]

These systems don’t exist in the same manner in the U.S., though some do and where they do, one could hear similar complaints of the exploitation of these systems. While in the U.S. the primary retort to immigrants was that they “stole jobs,” which suggested these Americans believed they had a right to access jobs, first or in perpetuity. What should have been noted was both of these systems–social benefits and jobs–were resources that may have been mitigated in the urban fabric, but not necessarily. While the vast majority of jobs or productivity occurred in cities and was from there leveraged for social benefits, many jobs still existed outside of the city. Increasingly the jobs were becoming virtual. How immigration to cities, which “it is safe to conclude that without a massive inflow of non-Americans, the biggest and most economically-vibrant American cities – New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Atlanta, Houston – would surely have stagnated or worse,” will resolve in an age of (potential) placelessness was yet to be seen, particularly when the jobs that required a person to be present (the immigrant?) were replaced by systems of automation. [4] Would we see Cyber Flight, a new version of White Flight, when the physical, cultural and economic infrastructure of cities was outpaced by the digital? I wondered how long people would continue to prefer NYC to LA, after a subway ride was no longer necessary, when remote work was the norm or when local taxation didn’t make sense, when the culture we prefered was online rather than in a museum or on the street. Was this happening already?

I met Jana at a fusion Vietnamese restaurant. It was fitting because I recalled that her father was a diplomat in Southeast Asia and had told me in 2012, also during Sound Development City, that the Vietnamese, i.e. Annam, were essentially Chinese fisherman who moved south down the coast. He was referring to the Lê Dynasty, based in Hà Nội. It made an impression on me, and by 2018, with some tiếng việt lịc sử I realized how contentious what he said really wa. Was referring to the Tang and successive dynasties, which conquered the Cham, or to the North which made a Communist state over the south.

Sound Development City was a three-part series of residencies of five days long, each part in a different city: Berlin, London and Zurich. 13 international artists met and explored each city through the framework of sound. At the time, my proposal had been to write a series of critical essays about cities; I had included my essay on the High Line and Ghost Capital as work samples.

The last time I met Jana she was self-identified as working in theater. Like Katharina, she expressed a sense of inferiority to the sound artists of Sound Development City. 2012 slightly predated a trend of institutions taking an interest in sound art; the trend has for the most part subsided, unfortunately, since I personally though it was more interesting in 2018 than before because sound was more widely in the use of sound in cinema (Hans Zimmer’s Blade Runner 2049), which may have been the last reason to see movies in the cinema, since an increasing number of people could afford inexpensive projectors for their home but few had sophisticated sound systems. Jana was writing scripts for television and web series. In 2012 she was just beginning her relationship with a Colombian; today she could appreciate the cultural differences in holidays and familiar relationships between Germans and Colombians. We agreed that the manner in which Latin families stay close was a technology in and of itself.

It was raining, cold and wet. Walking through the district I saw a synagogue with an armed guard, barricaded. It reminded me of the shooting in Pittsburg, the barricade around the Chabad Center for Jewish Discovery on 19th St. In 2010 I picked up a free book there, “Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations.” [5] Coincidences are a matter of time.


[1] "Agnieszka Polska: The Demon’s Brain," Hamburger Bahnhof: Museum für Gegenwart, Berlin, Germany, 27 September 2018 to 3 March 2019
https://www.smb.museum/en/museums-institutions/hamburger-bahnhof/exhibitions/detail/agnieszka-polska-the-demons-brain.html
[2] “How to talk with birds, trees, fish, shells, snakes, bulls and lions,” Hamburger Bahnhof: Museum für Gegenwart, Berlin, Germany 16 November 2018 to 12 May 2019
https://www.smb.museum/en/museums-institutions/hamburger-bahnhof/exhibitions/detail/how-to-talk-with-birds-trees-fish-shells-snakes-bulls-and-lions.html
[3] “Immigrants as urban saviors: When Immigrants Revive a City and When They Don’t - Lessons from the United States,” G. Pascal Zachary, Council of Europe, 2006
https://rm.coe.int/16804925d6
[4] Ibid.
[5] “Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations,” Abraham Miller, Westview Press, 1983.
https://www.amazon.com/Terrorism-Negotiations-Westview-National-International/dp/0891588566

20181209: Separating | Separated

While editing the Empire Kanal, I was reminded of Steven Weiss’s comment of how most European countries were shrinking in population, except Austria. Due to since it's wealth immigration had continued to drive its the population growth. But across Europe a reaction to this form of growth had taken hold in populist movements Hungary, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Austria and even in Spain. I was confused by the reaction and the portrayal of the each political argument in the media. Feeding on the debate, a division had been struck between opposing views. The trend was to label one party ‘far-right’ or ‘far-left.’ But mostly I was confused about each relationship to either political pole to labor.

During the 20th Century, the poles of right and left most coherently followed a relationship to labor with business owners to the right, and laborers to the left. In the 21st Century these two poles are complicated by a vigorous polarity of identity politics. In the US, the complication arose from the conservative party today being the larger supporters to end slavery, Radical Republicans introduced the 1866 civil rights bill, and predominantly supported the 1950s and 1960s civil rights acts. [1] The popular rebuttal to this confusing fact was that the motivation to end slavery was not an ethical decision, but intended to subordinate the power of slave states, which were expanding westward, motivated by the comparative fertility of the soil. That is, Lincoln and the Republicans were motivated by a relationship to labor.

The confusion continues in the history of labor unions and the socialist left. In the 19th and early 20th Century, labor unions were notoriously racist either by excluding blacks all together through constitutions or by-laws, or through the predominately white leadership. [2] [3] Not only were labor unions discriminatory against blacks but their growth during times of increased low-wage work supplied by immigrants equated to ethnic conflict.[4] It’s not hard to believe that many blacks were sympathetic to the Right to Work movements that sought to undermine the exclusivity of jobs to union contractors, although by the mid 20th Century, Martin Luther King Jr. was supporting union protesters.[5] [6] The current protest in populist movements seems vaguely familiar, but with a twist.

Democracy Now and the Financial Times, surrogates for the left and center of American politics respectively, portrayed the political party of Vox, from Andalucia, as “far-right.” The FT subtitle read “Extreme right energised by opposition to Catalan separatism and illegal immigration,” on their December post. [7] RT’s headline read “Right-wing ‘Reconquista?’ Anti-immigrant party enters parliament in Spain’s most populous region.” [8] Neither source actually engaged anyone from Vox, so I was curious to hear a spokesman of Vox denounce the label. [9] What is it meant by “far-right”?

The polarity of right and left in 2018 doesn’t follow the historic cogent divide based on a relationship to labor. “Far-right” and “far-left” became catch-all terms that described the subscription to or against the prioritization of an individual in their national state on economic terms but also how labor interfaced with social identities. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that a political platform or party couldn’t perfectly separate labor from identity. The result was first generation immigrants supporting Brexit, blacks who voted for Trump or Muslims who voted for Le Pen. [10] In the minds of their opposition, these individuals were gullible, confused, or traitors to their race. But in the race of identity politics, money always finishes first.

What’s more confusing is that even opposing poles may arrive to the same conclusion, in one or more of their sub-priorities, based on the success of another sub-priority. For example, Vox is, in part, a reaction to the Catalan independence events of 2017. Three of their four manifesto points reference a strong central state and Spain nation.[11] (A king, a dragon, a knight in shining armor?) But on the spectrum of polarity, if Vox was the far-right, then the Català independent movement was far-left? The autonomous region advocates immigration, the human rights of gender and sexual freedom, but curiously the strongest international supporters of the secession were Alex Jones, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and Vladimir Putin. [12][13][14] Russian meddling aside, from a simpleton perspective: why would right-winger a left-wing movement? This isn’t to say that the Catalan movement is necessarily right-wing. The elements ethnic preservation of language and culture that justified secession for residents of Cataluña, mirrored the claims for ethnic preservation of “Western culture” in France, Germany and Austria, but also the ethnic element that made Vox far-right. Collectively, these were identity politics concerns and resulted in the creation walls and a march toward separation.

Our attraction to one of the ideals of a political pole, even by the slightest sway, we were supposed to conclude in a complete opposition to all of the ideals of the opposite end of the spectrum. The references were to point to the most egregious examples of politics in the 20th Century. But far-right and far-left were both simplification of belief sets. This was the perversion of the logical formula, with contradiction, all else follows. A series of sub-priorities arise from this subscription: pro- or anti-immigration; pro- or anti-ethnic diversity; pro- or anti-social roles; pro- or anti-gender roles; pro- or anti-anti-social welfare systems. But what’s curious is that, at least some these sub-priorities are read through the lens of labor, yet completely flip the political pole in terms of the 20th Century orientation. The segment of nationalism that is anti-immigration claim that they are motivated by national right to labor and, I suppose, by extension, labor rights. Those on the left would suggest that the real motivation of nationalists opposing immigration is due to racial discrimination against the brown and black people immigrating. The support for labor on the left is through unionization or strong labor laws, yet Trump, a nationalist, was pro-union.

The relation to labor is, more profoundly, a relationship to production, where and how goods are produced. But again the distinction falls short. How would right-wing nationalists aim to preserve jobs for locals or how would left-wing activists garner support for unions are both antiquated models that percolate differently in a world of trade. In some countries nationalism equated to libertarian solution while other countries nationalism looked to centralized regulation. But then in a global, international context the reverse became true. Nationalists stood for de-regulation. Trump stood against free trade, having pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This was a flip-flop position of Clinton, and a partnership supported by Obama. Later Trump flip-flopped in responding to the OBOR with trade competition, “‘The new economic vision is obviously targeting China and the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, and will further complicate US-China relations,’ said Pang Zhongying, a Beijing-based international affairs analyst.”[15]

Hungary’s nationalist Prime Minister strongly supported the One Belt project stating, “Hungary has always been a supporter of the most possibly free and fair global trade network and we have always been supporters of the Eurasian cooperation. That is why we are absolutely interested in the success of the One Belt One Road Initiative and that is why we were the first European country to sign the bilateral cooperation agreement about its implementation.“[16] Does Eurasia include Syria, and would cooperation include housing refugees? Or was Orban a neo-liberal who believed in the movement of material goods and money but not people?

Under the belief to have a more reciprocated trade relationship than the decades of “free trade,” Madrid’s socialist President, Sanchez, also signed onto the One Belt Initiative.[17]

I heard a knock at the door and met Kseniya who had been working all day and had cabin fever. It was Sunday and the only establishment that was open was UP 25, a cocktail bar that was completely empty except for a couple who were holding anchor at the bar. We sat in the non-smoking section. A dart board and a disco-ball created the illusion of activity. I ordered a White Russian, believing it fitting of the anecdotes of Ukraine that Kseniya was recounting. She ordered the same. They were perfectly mixed, shaken, not stirred. A froth on top that permeated the blend. I drank mine before it separated.


[1] How Republicans went from the party of Lincoln to the party of Trump,” Andrew Prokop, Vox, November 10, 2016https://www.vox.com/2016/7/20/12148750/republican-party-trump-lincoln

[2] “Black Workers & the Unions,” Ray Marshall, Dissent Magazine, Winter 1972.
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/black-workers-the-unions

[3] “Up from Exclusion: Black and White Workers, Race and the State of Labor History,” Eric Arnesen, Reviews in American History, Volume 26, No. 1, March 1998.
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/28968/summary

[4] “Labor Unrest, Immigration, and Ethnic Conflict in Urban America, 1880-1914,” Susan Olzak, American Journal of Sociology, Volume 94, No. 6, 1989.
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/229156

[5] “Martin Luther King Jr. Championed Civil Rights and Labor Unions,” Berry Craig, America’s Unions, April 2, 2018
https://aflcio.org/2018/4/2/martin-luther-king-jr-championed-civil-rights-and-unions

[6] Keith Lumsden and Craig Petersen posit that Right to Work laws had little to no effect on unionization in the United States.

“The Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Unionization in the United States,” Journal of Political Economy 83, no. 6, 1975. Pp. 1237-1248
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/260392?journalCode=jpe

[7] “Extreme right energised by opposition to Catalan separatism and illegal immigration,” Ian Mount, Financial Times, December 3, 2018
https://www.ft.com/content/9353854a-f681-11e8-8b7c-6fa24bd5409c

[8] “Right-wing ‘Reconquista’? Anti-immigrant party enters parliament in Spain’s most populous region,” RT News, December 4, 2018
https://www.rt.com/news/445505-spain-anti-immgrant-vox-andalusia/

[9] “Could the rise of Vox bring fascism back to Spain?” Ivan Espinosa de los Monteros, TRT News, December 7, 2018
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=feLlL0GGCf8

[10] “Marine Le Pen’s surprise supporters,” David Patrikarakos, Politico, January 23, 2017 https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-surprise-muslim-islam-supporters-national-front-banlieues/

[11] “Nuestro Manifesto,” Vox, Spain, 2018.
https://www.voxespana.es/manifiesto-fundacional-vox

[12] “Breaking: Catalan Parliament Declares Independence from Spain,” Alex Jones, InfoWars, October 27, 2017.
https://www.infowars.com/breaking-catalan-parliament-declares-independence-from-spain/

[13] “Hungary to ‘respect’ will of people in Catalonia vote,” Jacopo Barigazzi, Politico, September 18, 2017.
https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-to-respect-will-of-people-in-catalonia-vote/

[14] “Putin Backs Spanish Integrity Amid Russian Meddling Claims in Catalonia,” Sputnik News, May 26, 2018
https://sputniknews.com/russia/201805261064832813-putin-spain-catalonia-vote-claims-meddling/

[15] “US competes with China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ with US$113 million Asian investment programme,” Shi Jiangtao, Owen Churchill, South China Morning Post, July 30, 2018
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2157381/us-competes-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-new-asian-investment

[16] “Speech of Viktor Orbán at the first China International Import Expo (CIIE),” Cabinet of the Office of the Prime Minister, Hungary, November 7, 2018.
http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-of-viktor-orban-at-the-first-china-international-import-expo-ciie

[17] “China, Spain pledge 'more balanced' trade ties,” France 24, November 28, 2018.
https://www.france24.com/en/20181128-china-spain-pledge-more-balanced-trade-ties